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Absirocf- We present a description and initial results of 
a computer code that coevolves Fuzzy Logic rules to 
play a two-sided zero-sum competitive game. It is 
based on the TEMPO Military Planning Game that has 
been used to teach resource allocation to over 20,000 
students over the past 40 years. No feasible algorithm 
for optimal play is known. The coevolved rules, when 
pitted against human players, usually win the first few 
competitions. For reasons not yet understood, the 
evolved rules (found in a symmetrical competition) 
place little value an information concerning the play 
of the opponent but rather focus on exploiting the 
available weapon systems. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Resource allocation in mission or market oriented large 
enterprises, either government depamnents or large 
businesses, is made difficult hy the large number of 
possible investment plans that could he considered. This 
complexity is in addition to the normal uncertainties 
associated with a changing environment - changing 
competition, technical innovation, etc. For example, within 
the US Department of Defense it is not uncommon for tens 
of thousands of different categories to be routinely 
examined annually. Decisions are then made to allocate 
funds and personnel for the forthcoming budget year as 
well projections for six years in the future. Similar 
activities and associated complexity are found in non- 
governmental organizations [I] .  
In the early 1960’s. the Department of Defense created a 
management system, the Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS) of considerable complexity to 
rationalize its resource allocation problems. A major 
training program was instituted to teach the PPBS and a 
“game” was created by General Electric’s TEMPO think 
tank to train people in the use of the new system. The 
Defense Management Resource Institute (DRMI) (see 
www.nps.navy.mil/drmi/98org.htm) has used the TEMPO 
game in its courses for nearly 40 years. Over 20,000 
students from 125 countries have benefited from exposure 
to this game. 
We became interested in resource allocation problems 
while conducting large scale, multLnation “futures” studies. 
Our studies used scenario methods [2]. An integral part of 
the multi-year competitive decision environment was 
allocation of national resources to defense. This forced 
trade-offs between investment in economic growth, foreign 
assistance, education, etc. These are a very complex set of 
decisions and we soon appreciated that we were trimming a 
very complex decision tree and had linle hope of 
understanding what other options might offer. The work 
presented here reports one facet of our research program, 
initiated in 2000, to deal with aspects of resource allocation 
problems in a world where your competitors are also able 
to make choices. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section I1 
provides an overview of coevolutionary approaches to 
optimization and game playing. Section I11 introduces the 
TEMPO game, and the following sectbn IV discusses 
some initial experiments. Section V presents the design of 
a new coevolutionary system and section VI a new set of 
experiments. Section VI1 concludes the paper indicating 
directions for future research. 
11. COEVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TOGAMES 
Games are characterized by rules that describe the 
moves each player can make. These moves constitute the 
behavior of the players, the manner in which each allocates 
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his resources. When a player makes a move, he receives a 
payoff; usually he tries to maximize the cumulative payoff 
over a period of time. In some games, such as chess, the 
payoff comes at the end of the game, but we can imagine a 
surrogate payoff, or evaluation function, that correlates 
with a player’s chances of winning at each point in the 
course of the game. 
Some games are competitive, others are cooperative, and 
still others are mixed, depending on the form of the 
evaluation function. If, for example, one player is gaining in 
payoff, the other player is losing payoff, it’s a competitive 
@me. 
The evaluation function is a key ingredient in a game- 
playing system. Sometimes, however, we have no idea of 
how to create a good evaluation function; there may be no 
clear measure of performance beyond simply whether you 
win, lose, or draw. 
The situation is similar to that of living creatures in 
nature, who are consummate problem solvers, constantly 
facing the most critical problem of avoiding being somwne 
else’s lunch. Many of their defensive and offensive 
survival strategies are genetically hardwired. But how did 
these strategies begin? We can trace similarities across 
many species. For example, many animals use cryptic 
coloration to blend into their background. They may be 
only distantly related, such as the leafy sea dragon and the 
chameleon, and yet their strategy is the same: don’t be 
noticed. Other animals have leamed that there is “safely in 
numbers,” including schooling fish and herd animals such as 
antelope. Furthermore, herding animals of many species 
have learned to seek out high elevations and form a ring 
looking outwards, so as to sight predators as early as 
possible. These complex behaviors were leamed over many 
generations of trial and mor, and a great deal of life and 
death. 
This is a process of coevolution. It is not simply one 
individual or species against its environment, but rather 
individuals against other individuals, each competing for 
resources in an environment that itself poses its own 
threats. Competing individuals use random variation and 
selection to seek out survival strategies that will give them 
an edge over their opposition. Antelope leamed to form a 
ring to spot predators more quickly; predators leamed to 
hunt in teams, and use the tall grasses of the savanna to 
mask their approach. Each innovation from one side may 
lead to an innovation from another, an “arms race” wherein 
individuals evolve to overcome challenges posed by other 
individuals, which are in tum evolving to overcome new 
challenges, and so forth. 
Note that the individual antelopes did not gather in a 
convention to discuss new ideas on survival and come up 
with the strategy of defensive rings on high ground. 
Nevertheless, the strategies are unmistakably a process of 
learning. When instinctual, they have been accumulated 
through random variation and selection, with no evaluation 
function other than life and death. The entire genome of the 
species i s  then the learning unit, with individuals as 
potential variations on a general theme. 
It is not surprising that coevolutionary processes have 
been used by many researchers, whether in optimization or 
in game playing. 
An example in optimization is Hillis’s now famous 
example of minimizing a sorting nehvork a ked sequence 
of operations for sorting a fixed-length string of numbers 
[3]. By an evolutionary search he had found a network that 
sorted 16 numbers with just 65 comparisons. Networks 
were scored on the fraction of d l  test cases (unsorted 
strings) that they sorted correctly. Hillis then noted that 
many of the sorting tests were too easy and only wasted 
time. He therefore devised a method in which two 
populatons coevolved sorting networks and sets of test 
cases. The networks were scored according to the limited 
number of test cases presented (IO to 20), and the test sets 
were scored on how well they found problems in the 
networks. Variation and selection were applied to both 
populatons; the test cases became more challenging as the 
networks improved. Hillis reported that the coevolutionary 
approach avoided stalling at local optima, and that it 
eventually found a network comprising only 61 
comparisons, (This is just 1 short of the best known 
network to date, discovered by Green and using 60 
comparisons [4].) 
Sebald and Schlenzig have studied the design of drug 
controllers for surgical patients by coevolving a population 
of so-called “CMAC” controllers, chosen for effectiveness, 
against a population of (simulated) patients, chosen for 
presenting difficulties [5 ] .  Many researchers have studied 
pursuit-evasion games, for example [GI. Various 
interesting approaches to conshint-satisfaction problems 
are reparted in [9-12]. With a bit of thought, what would 
appear to be a straightforward optimization problem can 
often be recast with advantage as a problem of coevolution. 
In the remainder of this section we mentbn some 
developments in game playing. 
In 1987 Axelrod studied the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(IPD) by an evolutionary simulation [13]. Strategies were 
represented as look-up tables giving a player’s move - 
cooperate or defect -as a function of the past 3 moves (at 
most) on each side. Strategies competed in a round-robin 
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f o n a t  (everyone plays against every possible opponent) 
for 151 moves in each encounter. The higher-scoring 
strategies were then favored for swiva l  using proportional 
selection, and new strategies were created by mutation and 
by one-point crossover. Axelrod made two observations. 
First, the mean score of the survivors decreased in the early 
generations, indicating defection, but then rose to a level 
indicating that the population had learned to cooperate. 
Second, many of the strategies that eventually evolved 
resembled the simple but effective strategy of “tit-for-tat” 
- cooperate on the first move, and then mirror the 
opponent’s last move. 
In 1993 Fogel studied the effect of changing the 
representation of strategies in the IPD, replacing Axelrods 
look-up tables with finite state machines [14, 151. The 
results were essentially the same as what Axelrod had 
observed. Harrald and Fogel, on the other hand, observed 
entirely different behavior in a version of IPD where the 
player could make moves on a continuous numeric scale 
from -1 (complete defection) to 1 (complete cooperation) 
[16]. Strategies were represented by artificial neural 
networks. In the vast majority of trials payoffs tended to 
decrease, not increase. D m e n  and Yao observed similar 
results in a variation of IPD with eight options, rather than 
two or a continuous range [17]. They observed, first, that 
as the number of options to play increases, the fraction of 
the total game matdx that is explored decreases. Second, 
when the IPD had more choices, strategies evolved into 
two types, where the two types depended on each other 
for high payoffs and did not necessarily receive high 
payoffs when playing against members of their own type 
These observations are very interesting, yet they 
perhaps do not fully explain the degradation in payoff that 
is seen when a continuous range of options is employed. 
Hundreds of papers about the prisoner’s dilemma are 
written each year, and very many of the contributions to 
this literature have involved evolutionary algorithms in 
different forms. These and many other studies indicate the 
potential for using coevolutionary simulation to study the 
emergence of strategies in simple and complex games. 
In the late 1990s and into 2000, Chellapilla and Fogel 
implemented a coevolutionary system that taught itself to 
play checkers at a level on par with human experts. The 
system worked like this. Each position was represented as 
a vector of 32 components, correspmding to the available 
positions on the board. Components could take on values 
from (-K, -1, 0, + I ,  K), where K was an evolvable real 
value assigned to a king, and 1 was the value for a regular 
checker. A 0 represented an empty square, positive values 
indicated pieces belonging to the player, and negative 
values were for the opponent’s pieces. The vector 
components served as inputs to a neural network with an 
input layer, multiple hidden layers, and an output node. 
The output value served as a static evaluation function for 
positions -the more positive the value, the more the neural 
network “liked” the position, and the more negative, the 
more it “disliked” the position. Minimax was used to select 
the best move at each play based on the evaluations from 
the neural network. 
The coevolutionary system started with a population of 
15 neural networks, each having its weighted connections 
and K value set at random. Each of the 15 parent networks 
created an offspring through mutation of the weights and K 
value, and then the 30 neural networks competed in games 
of checkers Points were awarded for winning (+I), losing 
(-2), or drawing (0). The 15 highest-scoring networks were 
selected as parents for the next generation, with this 
process of coevolutionary self-play iterating for hundreds 
of generations. The networks did not receive feedback 
about specific games or external judgments on the quality 
of moves. The only feedback was an aggregate score for a 
series of games. 
The best evolved neural network (at generation 840) was 
tested by hand, using the screen name “BlondieZV, against 
real people playing over the Intemet n a free checkers 
website. Atter 165 games, Blondie24 was rated in the top 
500 of 120,000 registered players on the site. The details 
of this research are in [18-211. 
There are IO2’ possible positions in checkers, far too 
many to enumerate, and checkers remains an unsolved 
game: nobody knows for sure whether the game is a win 
for red, a win for white, or a draw. Chess, at IO‘” 
positions, is still further from being solved. But Fogel and 
Hays have combined neural networks and coevolution to 
create a master-level chess-playing program, again without 
giving the simulated players any feedback about specific 
games [22]. 
Coevolution can be a versatile method for optimizing 
solutions to complex games, and a reasonable choice for 
exploring for useful strategies when there’s little available 
information about the domain. 
Ill. THETEMPO GAME 
The TEMPO Military Planning Game is a two-sided 
zero-sum competitive game. Teams of players compete in 
building force structures by dividing limited budgets, over a 
succession of budgeting periods (“years”) between 
categories such as “acquisition” and “operation” of 
“offensive units” and “defensive units”. The rules are no 
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more complex than the rules of, say, Monopoly”. 
However, players leam that the rules’ apparent simplicity 
is deceptive: they pose challenging and difficult decision 
problems. No feasible algorithm for optimal play is known. 
The full set of investment categories for the TEMPO 
game comprises: (1) operation of existing forces, (2) 
acquisition of additional or modified forces, (3) research 
and development (“MD), (4) intelligence, ( 5 )  counter- 
intelligence. 
There are four types of forces: two offensive 
(“Offensive A and B )  and two defensive (“Defensive A 
and B ) .  Each type comprises several weapon systems 
with varying acquisition and operation costs (measured in 
“dollars”), measures of effectiveness (in “utils”), and dates 
of availability (in “years”). A team’s objective is to 
maximize its total “net offensive utils”. A team’s net 
offensive utils of type A are the total utils for its operating 
Offensive A units, minus the opposing team’s Defensive 
A, but not less than zero. Likewise for type B. Thus there 
is no advantage in investing more in a defensive system 
than is necessary to counter the opponent’s offensive 
systems of the same type. 
R&D is current investment that buys the possibility in a 
future year of acquiring new weapon systems, possibly 
with better pricelperformance ratios than those now 
available. Investment in intelligence buys information aboul 
the opponent’s operating forces and investment activities. 
Investment in counterintelligence degrades the information 
the opponent obtains through intelligence. 
Every year the probability of wur (PWur) is announced. 
When this is low, players may well decide to invest 
heavily in R&D and acquisition of new units; when it is 
high, they may prefer to concentrate on operating existing 
units. 
Iv. INITIAL EXPERIMENTS 
In 2000 we did some experiments applying EC to a 
highly simplified version of the TEMPOgame. There were 
only one offensive and one defensive weapon system. 
M D ,  intelligence, and counterintelligence were eliminated. 
The experiments were done with the help of John Koza’s 
simple Lisp code for Genetic hogramming [23], 
Individuals (candidate algorithms) were represented as 
computer programs in a simple Lisp-like language, written 
in terms of variables that describe the current state, and 
operations that attempt to allocate funds to various 
categories for the coming budgeting period. State variables 
included the current total available budget, PWar, currenl 
inventories, acquisition limits, prices, and operating costs 
for the offensive and defensive units. The budget categories 
were acquisition and operation of offensive and defensive 
units. Investment algorithms were evaluated for fitness by 
pitting each in games against a selection of others from the 
same population and recording wins and losses. 
The question was if anything reasonable would emerge 
in such a simple framework? And indeed, starting from an 
initial generation of completely random programs, an 
algorithm was evolved that allocated funds according to 
rudimentary sensible rules, which can be characterized as 
“dumb, but not crazy”: it would not attempt to acquire 
units beyond the appropriate acquisition limits or to 
operate units beyond the number in inventory, and it 
incorporated a check to assure that an initial allocation to 
operation of offensive units had not exhausted available 
funds before futher allocations were attempted. 
V. DESIGNOFNEW SYSTEM 
In an attempt to improve the evolution of human 
readable rules we designed a coevolutionary system that 
evolves Fuzzy Logic rulebases to play the TEMPO game. 
The new svstem has the followine features: - 
Each individual can encode a maximum of w rules 
for acquiring and operating weapons (“weapon 
rules”) and i rules for buying intelligence or 
counterintelligence (We1 rules”). 
Each rule can use one or more of the available 
environmental parameters I. 
We use the Mamdani Fuzzy Logic System with 
Gaussian membership functions ’, Singleton 
Fuzzyfier, product operation rule for fuzzy AND, 
and Centre of Average Defuzzyfcation. 
The weapon rules assign a value (a “desirability”) 
to each weapon system; the intel rules assign a 
value to each intelligencdcounterintelligence 
category. The budget is allocated by linear scaling 
of these values, followed by normalization in order 
not to exceed the available budget. 
We use two populations A and E, each consisting 
of m individuals with a fixed genotype length n. 
The decoded phenotype has a varying number of 
rules and membership functions ’ with a maximum 
number (given by the maximum length n of the 
chromosome). 
’ mere arc a to~al of 20+ envimnmatal parameters far weapon allocation 
and intelligence gathering. 
’Rules and inputs c m  be ‘“pruned“, i . e .  be ”NULL“ and hence not used. 
Pruningrcdussdthecffecr ofovdeaming. The litncssrsflcctr lhataamaller 
rulebase is preferable using a static penally approach. 
We use one Gaussian spreading parameter for each input. 
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e Each individual from population A (5) is evaluated 
by letting it compete against o randomly chosen 
opponents from the population B (A). The fitness 
of each individual is its average “net offensive utils” 
minus a penalty term that is linear in the number of 
parameters used by the Fuzzy Logic System (for 
“pruning”). Hence, more compact well-performing 
rulebases are preferred during the evolution. 
The mutation operator could perform either small 
or large mutations of each parameter with a small 
probability PMul. A mutation would be a variation 
of a parameter by adding a randomly distributed 
value in the range kd, hl] or [-dil0, td / lO]  for 
large or small mutation respectably. 
The crossover operator is a standard two-point 
crossover. 
For each population the environment changes from 
game to game, i.e., available weapons and 
effectiveness and prices change. This results in a 
dynamically changing environment in which the 
rulebases have to make budget allocations. 
Starting from random populations the 
coevolutionary system develops powerful Fuzzy 
Logic rulebases. In order to get an understanding of 
some kind-of “absolute” performance the best 
performing individual we let it play against a static 
“expert” based on simple heuristics (expressed as 
Fuzzy Logic rules). The performance against the 
“expert” is not included in any fitness calculations 
but is used to understand the quality of the evolved 
rulebases during the evolution. 
The rules can be presented in a form that can be 
understood easily by humans; one reason for choosing 
Fuzzy Logic. Here is an example: 
IF [Pwar IS very LOW - L O W ]  
[CATEGORY IS DEFENSIVE1 
[SUBTYPE IS 1 OR 21 
[Inventory IS Low1 
[MaxdcguisitonUnits IS Low - Medium1 
IAcquisitionCost IS very Lowl 
[UtilsPerdcguisi tioncost IS Very Lowl 
[Evaluation IS Low1 
THEN 
The terms of the “if’ part refer to seven of the 
environment variables that are available for constructing a 
weapon rule. A term like “dcquisitionCost I S  
Very LOW” refers to the degree of membership of the 
acquisition cost in a certain fuzzy set represented 
intemally by a Gaussian membership function with a given 
center c and standard deviation a The program uses the 
actual numeric values of c and ointemally, and these are 
the quantities that mutation and crossover operate on. But 
for the human reader, expressions like “Very Law” are 
presented, as presumably more palatable than a pair of 
numbers like 48.7682, 17.1056. The range of meaningful 
acquisition costs is divided into five subranges running 
from “Very Low” to “Very High”. Here the interval c+o 
lies within the “Very Low” subrange for acquisition costs. 
The   valuation I S  Low” in the “then” part of the 
rule refers to a “desirability” value. Again the program uses 
a specific number. The human reader is told that the 
number is in the low subrange of possible “goodness” 
values. Thus, to the extent that the rule applies to a 
weapon, it is a reason not to buy it. 
VI. NEwEXPER~MENTS 
Initial experience with the coevolution code immediately 
demonstrated the power of the approach -it proceeded to 
win first games with most of those who played against the 
derived rules. It was also clear early on, Winter 2001, that 
the coevolved rules didn’t value information about the 
opponent’s choices. That is, no rules for buying 
intelligence or counter-intelligence were of sufficient value 
to be included in the evolved set. Similar behavior had been 
seen in play of the TEMPO paper game when we were 
using it to teach our students. We attributed this either to 
avoidance of excessive inputs - a common human strategy 
for coping with information overload - or to the “gaming of 
the game” that occurs when you know approximately 
when the game will be over. Another possibility was that 
since the initial version of the TEMPO code provided 
information that was not quantitative on what the 
opponent was getting with investments made, there was 
truly little value. We did some preliminary investigations 
to determine if we could configure the game so that there 
might be value to buymg intelligence. We gave player X a 
larger budget and immediate access to all weapons as they 
became available, while player Y had a smaller budget and 
was delayed one year in having investment opportunity on 
the various weapons. This coupled with a reduction in the 
prolixity penalty did produce a few “weak” rules for the 
purchase of intelligence by the disadvantaged player. 
These efforts immediately highlighted another problem. 
It had taken approximately 2 weeks of computation on a 
single 3 GHz processor to coevolve the initial rules. To 
prnperly investigate issues of the sort just described would 
require faster computational turnaround. We embarked on a 
porting of the coevolutionary code to the Processing Graph 
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Method Tool (PGMT), a parallel computing program 
support system developed at the Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL+see [24, 251. An application under 
PGMT is represented as a datbflow graph (similar to a 
Petri net) whose processing nodes can run in parallel on 
separate processors. The mapping of nodes to physical 
processors takes place at runtime. This flexibility 
facilitates moving an application, without rewriting, from 
one parallel-processing system to a very different one- 
from a small, heterogeneous network of workstations, say, 
to a large, homogeneous, high-performance shared-memory 
multi-processor system. (Tempo examples were run on 
two machines of the latter type at NRL’s Distributed 
Center for High Performance Computing: Silicon Graphics 
Origin@ 3800 and Altix@ systems.) 
We also modified the information provided to be more 
useful. A rule input was provided indicating whether the 
opponent had bought counterintellignence. An input giving 
the initially available number of units of a weapon system 
was replaced with one giving the player’s current 
invemtory. The opponent’s operating forces were given in 
total utils rather than number of weapon units and these 
values were given as absolute current values, rather than as 
changes relative to the previous year. This last change was 
motivated by the fact that the rules incorporate no 
“memory” of previous years’ decisions. 
The result of a coevolution using these modifications has 
been used in an economics course at NPS. In addition to 
the coevolutionary system, there is a game system that lets 
a human player play against a saved individual, The 
computer distributes its budget according to its rule base, 
while the human player interacts with the game system 
through a spreadsheed interface. Many of the students 
needed three or four tries before achieving an outcome that 
they were willing to submit for grading. Thus we continue 
to see human-competitive play in the coevolved rules. One 
of our colleagues, an economist with previous experience 
with the DFWI paper form of the game, was able through 
prolonged and concerted effort to beat the machine by a 
small margin on a first try. During play, he was ascribing 
all manner of sophisticated motivations to the machine for 
its moves. He was dismayed to learn afterward that he had 
been competing against a set of precisely three rules: the 
one shown above in section V and the following two 
others. 
IF [ B u d g e t  IS Low - M e d i u m ]  
IEnemyCounter intel  IS NOT BOUGHT] 
[SUBTYPE I S  1 1  
[ U t i l s  Is Lowl 
[UtilsPerdcquisitionCost IS V e r y  
High]  
[ Y e a r A v a i l a b l e  IS M e d i u m J  
[ E v a l u a t i o n  IS Lowl 
THEN 
IF [ B u d g e t  IS LOW] 
[CATEGORY IS OFFENSIVE] 
[TYPE I S  E1 
l u t i l s  IS  V e r y  Highl 
[Yeardvailable I S  M e d i u m  - H i g h l  
[EnemyOffens iveUt i l s  IS 
[EnemyDefensiveUti ls  IS 
unknown OR V e r y  Lowl 
unknown OR V e r y  Lowl 
THEN 
[ E v a l u a t i o n  IS V e r y  High]  
Such a low number of rules is not atypical. Figure 1 
shows how the number of rules used by the best player 
during the coevolution varied over the first 600 generation. 
The actual run went to generation 1927, but instances of 3- 
tule best players were already appearing before generation 
500. 
LII 
8 20 - 2 15 
3 5  
0 
; 10 
0 1W MO 300 400 500 M)O 
GeneraUon 
Figure 1. Number of rules used by best player of generation. 
With the availability of the PGM2 port, we are 
beginning to be able to use larger populations experiment 
with somewhat larger problems than previously, in 
particular to increase the number of weapon systems from 
2 to a dozen or so. Doing so, with further relaxation of 
parsimony pressure, seems to encourage appearance of rule 
sets (now larger than 3 rules) containing intel rules with 
High or Very High in their “then” parts. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS ANDFUTURE WORK 
Four years ago as we started this work we didn’t know 
if resource allocation problems of the type described in the 
TEMPO-paper game would be approachable using 
coevolutionary computation methods. And, even though 
the initial LISP experimental system suggested an 
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affirmative answer, the nature of what we could leam from 
a coevolutionary system was not obvious to us. We have 
leamed a number of surprising things: 





The environment, e.g., PWar, budget sue,  sequence of 
available weapon types, cost per utile, etc, is 
important but knowing what your opponent is doing 
- intelligence information - is a far slippier 
component in a sequential game of non-abelian 
decisions. 
Though the derived N k S  can beat most human 
players immediately, the human players are able to 
leam the "manner of play" of the machine codes. This 
suggests that "intel" may after all be important for the 
machine players to consistently win. 
Exploring questions that arise, as in 1. and 2., will 
require a large and growing computational 
environment. Fortunately, the choice of PGMT has 
facilitated our ability to move between different multi- 
processor environments with a minimal amount of 
recoding. 
The prolixity penalty appears likely to be useful as a 
proxy for the information handling capacity of the 
"decision maker". The more rules an organization 
uses to make decisions the greater the demand for 
information processing capability. Since most large 
organization use fairly simple metaphors for making 
decisions, and these metaphors can be captured as "if- 
then" rules, it is possible to imagine exploring 
alternative N k S  using different fitness functions to 
determine why organizations have come to the rules 
they use. This is very much like the "inverse 
problem" where given a result we have to find out 
what was a potential cause of that result. 
Non-transitive (paper, rock, scissors) ordering of 
strategies seems to be possible. 
We are just at the beginning of this research and its 
application. We 'need to understand why the code 
produces rules that favor allocation of most effort to 
evaluating the cost per utils of weapon capability and pay 
little attention to the value of the opponent's behavior. 
We also need to include investment opportunities in R&D, 
including both modernization and totally new systems. 
The current system has PWar and budgets as extemally 
supplied values. A hierarchical competition where the 
higher-level system that determines these values interacts 
with the current game is of considerable interest. This 
would bring us closer to a tool for improving our 
understanding of complex planning problems that initiated 
this research in 2000. 
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